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INTRODUCTION
Although systems of classification and organization are popular in the
natural sciences, it is not so in law. Ever since the age of legal realism, and
probably long before, a jurisprudence of concepts or ideas has fallen out
of fashion in favor of a system focused upon the interests involved in a
case. Resolving legal disputes in a fair and equitable manner has taken
precedence over rigid conceptualizations as to what rules are applicable to
what classes or categories of contracts. Casuistry, although not popular in
many dogmatic conceptions of civil codes, is popular today. As the late
Tony Weir once wrote:
It is possible for us, like Hamlet, to tell a hawk from a handsaw,
and to do so without a complete theory of aerial predators or an
exhaustive inventory of the carpenter’s toolbox; furthermore, we
can effect such telling without having a theory of telling, though
the current fad of epistemology might lead one to doubt that (given
a theory of doubting).1
Certainly, the Romans would have agreed. In fact, this Article purports
to follow the advice of Tony Weir and the example of Hamlet in
distinguishing and explaining the various types of contracts that exist
under the Louisiana Civil Code but without purporting to proffer a new
theory of contracts that would necessarily harmonize them all. In fact, such
a theory has eluded the drafters of the Louisiana Civil Code for the last
200 years and, before them, French scholars and Roman jurists. Any
attempted system would likely be unsatisfactory and, consequently, none
shall be offered.
The consequences of appropriate classification may not be obvious at
first glance and, in fact, the usefulness of engaging in the exercise at all
has varied throughout the ages. In Roman times, the matter of
classification dictated the matter of enforceability.2 Without finding an
appropriate class or box for an interaction to reside, the relationship
between the parties risked unenforceability. Over the course of time, the
1. Tony Weir, Contracts in Rome and England, 66 TUL. L. REV. 1615, 1616
(1992) (footnote omitted) (quoting Shakespeare: “I am but mad north-north-west.
When the wind is southerly, I know a hawk from a handsaw.” WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act. 2, sc. 2, ll. 388–89). Hamlet’s reference to a “handsaw”
may not be an allusion to the carpenter’s tool, but to another bird, the hernshaw. 1
SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1224 (Lesley Brown ed., 1993).
2. JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT,
CONTRACT, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 287–89 (2006) [hereinafter GORDLEY,
FOUNDATIONS].
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matter changed as contracts became enforceable based upon their
adherence to a general theory, such as the “will” theory, be it a subjective
internalization requirement or an objective manifestation of consent.
Nonetheless, much of the classificatory system inherited from the Romans
has persisted.
Although the civil law mind and civil law style eschew the types of
definitions in the law that are necessary for classification,3 both the
Louisiana and the French Civil Codes specify definitions for various types
of classifications of contracts.4 The purpose behind classification of “legal
concepts”—or in this case, contracts—has been persuasively discussed by
the honoree of this Symposium, Professor Alain Levasseur, who has
delineated three goals or purposes of classifying concepts. The first is “to
be able to bring a given factual situation under a concept or another so that
the factual situation will flow automatically from the proper classification
under the appropriate concept.”5 Of course, this rationale would be
rejected by those who believe that law should be more pragmatic and less
doctrinaire or by those who reject the impartiality and coherence of legal
analysis altogether.6 For others who prefer rigorous analysis and
conceptual purity, however, knowing how to distinguish an immovable
from a movable is necessary to determine the relevant law to apply in a
given context, such as the requisite form of the contract needed for
transfer.7
A second reason Professor Levasseur gives for having an accurate
classification scheme is “to protect against the danger of polysemy or a
3. E. Allan Farnsworth, A Common Lawyer’s View of His Civilian Colleagues,
57 LA. L. REV. 227, 233 (1996).
4. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1102−1107 (Fr.); LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1907−1916
(2016). It has been suggested that the civil law’s resistance to the common law fetish
of definitions as part of the law can be explained—along with lengthy and verbose
legislative drafting—in part by the common law’s distrust of judges to properly
interpret the law. Farnsworth, supra note 3, at 233. Other civil codes, such as the
German and Japanese Civil Codes, have resisted the temptation to contain
definitions. See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] (Ger.)
(containing no classificatory definitions of contracts); Akira Kamo, Crystallization,
Unification, or Differentiation? The Japanese Civil Code (Law of Obligations)
Reform Commission and Basic Reform Policy (Draft Proposals), 24 COLUM. J.
ASIAN L. 171, 178 (2010).
5. ALAIN A. LEVASSEUR, LOUISIANA LAW OF CONVENTIONAL OBLIGATIONS: A
PRÉCIS 3 (2010).
6. See, e.g., JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE 231−32 (1991) [hereinafter GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL
ORIGINS].
7. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 1839, with id. art. 1846.
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possible plurality of meanings being given to the same word.”8 Without an
accurate or definite statement as to a term’s meaning, the risk of muddled
understandings and loose interpretations is great. Professor Levasseur
cites the multiple meanings that could be given to the word “act” as an
example. If the law were not precise in its classification of and use of the
term “act,” there could be great risk of confusion between “juridical acts,”
“written acts,” “physical acts,” and even perhaps “acts of nature,” all of
which may not demand the same or similar legal treatment. Another
example could be the characterization of some obligations as “personal”
or “strictly personal.”9 Although these words distinguish obligations based
on their heritability, courts and commentators have confused these terms
with those that distinguish between obligations involving contractual
rights generally and real ones involving property.10
A third and final reason is “for purposes of education and legal
analysis.”11 Indeed, the late Saúl Litvinoff, the Reporter for the 1984
revision of the law of obligations, has acknowledged the “didactic” nature
of the revisions.12 As has been remarked, “[a] civil code should contain
doctrinal elements that explain the principles and rules and put them in
context.”13 As much as for the lawyer as for the student and the citizen, the
civil code should elucidate and explain the meaning, context, and scope of
the law.
With these three purposes in mind, this Article attempts to properly
classify, consistently define, and accurately explain the Louisiana Civil
Code’s approach to classifying contracts. The Civil Code articles on
classification of contracts in Louisiana are generally known but little
understood. Although many lawyers can recite the definitional difference
between bilateral and onerous contracts, few could explain how the two
differ and what difference, if any, their distinction makes in practice. Add
to the confusion the concept of commutative contracts, whose definition

8. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3.
9. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1766.
10. Cf. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 422 (2016). For an example of the
confusion, see Succession of Ricks, 893 So. 2d 98 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
11. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3.
12. Saúl Litvinoff, Introduction: The 1984 Revision of the Louisiana Civil
Code’s Articles on Obligations – A Student Symposium, 45 LA. L. REV. 747, 748
(1985).
13. Michael McAuley, The Pedagogical Code, 63 LA. L. REV. 1293, 1302
(2003).
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appears to have changed over time, and even the most erudite lawyers,
scholars, and judges are left to speculate as to what the drafters intended.14
To compound this challenge, the revision process of the Louisiana Civil
Code, although salutary in many ways, has at times magnified the confusion.
The Louisiana Civil Code has been undergoing a comprehensive revision
since 1976. The process for doing so has been caustically but accurately
described as “piecemeal,”15 often with the right hand not knowing what the
left is doing. One subject matter committee is charged to revise the law of
“contracts” and another to rewrite the law of “sales” and yet another to
rewrite the law of “deposit.”16 Indeed, in recent times, the granularity and
specialization of committees has approached an almost microscopic level,
with some committees designed to cover a single civil code article17 or a
single concept.18 Although membership on committees is often overlapping,
consistency in approach and concepts, if it exists, is not uniform.19 This has,
regrettably, led the Louisiana Civil Code to adopt rules in one section that
do not always coordinate with the rules and principles in other sections.
Thus, one area of the Civil Code may be revised, and a classificatory term
may be discarded or changed without a full appreciation of its connection to
or impact on other areas of the Civil Code.
Doctrine in many instances has filled the legislative gaps and helped
explain some of the confusion. With respect to the rules on classification of
contracts, however, virtually no doctrine exists since the recodification of
1984.20 This Article hopes to fill that gap, beginning with a background of
14. LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 8 (“What does ‘correlative’ mean and how
can its meaning fit in the definition of both [Louisiana Civil Code articles] 1908
and 1911?”).
15. A.N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A Commemorative Essay,
78 TUL. L. REV. 379, 397 (2003); see generally Vernon V. Palmer, The Death of
a Code – The Birth of a Digest, 63 TUL. L. REV. 221 (1988).
16. See generally Committees, LA. ST. L. INST., http://www.lsli.org/committees
#18 (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
17. See, e.g., id. at “Component Parts Committee” (constituted to revise
article 466 of the Civil Code).
18. See, e.g., id. at “Counterletter Committee” (formed to respond to a
specific legislative resolution proposing to abolish counterletters).
19. Although the Council of the Law Institute and the Coordinating and
Semantics Committee are designed to achieve some form of uniformity, the Council
membership is vast and changing from meeting to meeting, and the resources and
time available to the Coordinating and Semantics Committee are very limited. For
membership of both, see generally id.; Council Members, LA. ST. L. INST.,
http://www.lsli.org/council-members (last visited Feb. 5, 2016).
20. One notable exception is contained in Professor Levasseur’s Louisiana
Law of Conventional Obligations: A Précis. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 3–
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the Roman and French rules on classification of contracts to lay a
foundation for understanding the rules specific in the Louisiana Civil
Code. Although helpful, those Roman and French rules have not been
well-understood and suffer from a number of defects or limitations.
Subsequent revisions throughout the Louisiana Civil Code have proceeded
without a firm foundation of this classification scheme, which has made
harmonization and application of the existing scheme even more complex.
Although the bulk of this Article is a critique of Louisiana law’s current
classification of contracts, it is not dogmatic in its approach. The hope and
purpose is to elucidate and clarify the current classificatory scheme for
contracts in Louisiana while also demonstrating the imperfect nature of
any scheme and the need for flexibility.
I. A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF ROMAN CONTRACT CLASSIFICATIONS
The Romans had no general theory of contracts but, rather like the
English, created enforceable contracts in certain situations when specific
circumstances required.21 Indeed, some have classified the eight
specifically enforceable Roman contracts as “ris[ing] like islands in the
sea, an archipelago not a single continent.”22 These islands, however, were
originally an unforgiving lot. Failure to moor one’s boat on an island
risked the death of a transaction. Stated more straightforwardly, failure to
fall within one of the classes of contract did not, like modern law, mean
that a different set of rules might apply. Rather, it meant that the
transaction was not enforceable at all. These eight classes of contracts,
which covered “the whole range of commercial and social life,” provided
a definitive—even if later unsatisfactory—answer to the question of
“[w]hat promises are binding at law.”23 Because this terrain is so well4. For older pre-revision works on this topic, see SAÚL LITVINOFF, OBLIGATIONS,
in 6 LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 139–208 (1969); Andrew J.S. Jumonville,
Comment, Personal Services About the Home, 23 LA. L. REV. 416 (1963); J.
Denson Smith, A Refresher Course in Cause, 12 LA. L. REV 2, 15–29 (1951);
Leonard Oppenheim, Comment, The Unilateral Contract in the Civil Law and in
Louisiana, 16 TUL. L. REV. 456 (1942).
21. THE ROMAN LAW READER 91–144 (F.H. Lawson ed., 1969); PETER
BIRKS, THE ROMAN LAW OF OBLIGATIONS 30 (Eric Descheemaeker ed., 2014);
Weir, supra note 1, at 1616; GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 290. For
an overview of Roman contract law, see W.W. BUCKLAND, THE MAIN
INSTITUTIONS OF ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 253–80 (1931); ALAN WATSON, THE
LAW OF OBLIGATIONS IN THE LATER ROMAN REPUBLIC (1965).
22. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 30.
23. Id. at 29–30; Alan Watson, The Evolution of Law: The Roman System of
Contracts, 2 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 8 (1984).
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ploughed, there is no need to re-till the field here. A brief overview of the
classification of Roman contracts, however, is helpful and perhaps
essential background for understanding the system of classification that
prevails today.
A. Consensual Contracts
There were four consensual contracts at Roman law—sale (emptiovenditio), hire (locatio-conductio), partnership (societas), and mandate
(mandatum)—so called because they were enforceable by the mere
consent of the parties without any other formality.24 Although this feature
alone does not strike the modern mind as noteworthy, the importance can
be seen in comparison to contracts re, where consent was not key because
no contract existed unless a thing (a res) was also actually delivered.
Undoubtedly, the consensual contract classification was the most
important in Roman law, both in terms of its commonality and in terms of
its scope.25 Lawson has noted that the modern concept of contract sprang
from the Roman class of consensual contracts.26 As no rigid formalities
were required, consent was their foundation. Unlike a number of other
contracts, the consensual ones gave rise to actions that allowed the judge
to grant the plaintiff relief for whatever was due to him, not under the terms
of the contract or the strict law, but under good faith (ex fide bona).27
B. Contracts Re
Like consensual contracts, there were four distinct contracts re. They
were mutuum (loan for consumption), commodatum (loan for use), depositum
(deposit), and pignus (pledge).28 In contrast to consensual contracts, the
commonality of these contracts was that no contract existed until delivery of
the thing loaned, deposited, or pledged. Once delivery occurred, an
enforceable contract arose. In fact, an agreement to make a deposit, confect a
loan for use or consumption, or offer a pledge was unenforceable at Roman
law as a nudum pactum. Barry Nicholas notes that “real contracts” were
probably not as important to Roman law as their prominence in some
Justinianic texts suggests.29 After all, only pignus (pledge) was really a
24. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES §§ 3.13.22–26 (Peter Birks & Grant McLeod
trans., 1987).
25. See THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 21, at 93–94.
26. Id. at 94.
27. Id. at 104.
28. JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES, supra note 24, § 3.3.14.
29. BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAW 169 (1962).
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commercial transaction.30 The others—loan and deposit—were
uncompensated and thus ordinarily took place between friends.31
C. Contracts Verbis
A contract verbis is a contract “made by word of mouth.”32 Although
not the only type of contract verbis, the stipulatio was the most
important.33 The stipulatio was a simple method “in which any
undertaking could be rendered binding, provided it were not substantially
improper as involving a wrong or unacceptable as burdening a right.”34
Many believed the stipulatio was a “very ancient contract” going “back to
the time of the Twelve Tables.”35 This contract was an oral exchange of
promises that likely required the use of certain solemn or special words.36
It was a stricti iuris contract, as opposed to one subject to good faith,
meaning that it was not subject to “equitable defenses” or any “implied
obligations” and “never offered much protection beyond its express
terms.”37 Although the stipulatio has no equivalent in modern law, it has
been characterized as one of the devices that met the need for a general
theory of contract because it “could be adapted to any content” and any
circumstance.38
D. Contracts Litteris
The contract litteris was a contract made by a writing.39 This type of
contract seems a bit obscure to the modern mind and, even in Roman
times, its application seems to have been limited. Alan Watson provides a
helpful explanation of this type of contract:
We have no real indications of how or when or to what end the
literal contract arose, and hence no argument can be drawn from
it for or against any theory of the growth of Roman contract law.
It was in existence by around the beginning of the first century
B.C. but may well be much older. In classical law it arose when a
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id.
BIRKS, supra note 21, at 52.
Id.
Weir, supra note 1, at 1618.
BIRKS, supra note 21, at 53.
Id. at 53–57.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 30.
Id. at 38.
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Roman head of family marked in his account books that a debt had
been paid when it had not, then made an entry to the effect that a
loan had been made when it had not. Thus it was not an originating
contract but a method of transforming one kind of obligation into
another. Whether that was also the case when the literal contract
first came into being, and whether in the beginning the writing had
to be in the formal account books is not clear. The action was the
actio certae pecuniae, and therefore had to be for a fixed amount
of money.40
Although the contract litteris flourished in the mid to late first century
A.D., “when the eruption of Vesuvius destroyed Pompeii, . . . it had
apparently disappeared from use by the end of the classical period.”41 Its
relevance in modern law is nonexistent.
E. Innominate Contracts
Despite the apparent completeness of the four-fold division of
contracts identified above and delineated in Justinian’s Institutes, the
classification was “imperfect” and thus another category was created—the
so-called innominate contracts.42 Innominate contracts were “agreements
which did not fall under one of four accepted categories of contracts, but
were thought worthy of enforceability by the praetor.”43 Innominate
contracts were not enforceable merely by virtue of consent, but became
“enforceable only on part performance,”44 that is, when one party
performed his end of the agreement but the other party did not. Somewhat
counterintuitively, the category of innominate contracts is populated by
many contracts, most of which had names—specifically, the transactio,
the aestimatum, the permutatio, and the precarium.45 Although only the
transactio and permutatio exist today as the compromise46 and exchange47
contracts, the precarium and the aestimatum were peculiarly Roman law
institutions. They consisted of a grant of use of property for a period of
40. Watson, supra note 23, at 14.
41. Id.
42. THE ROMAN LAW READER, supra note 21, at 96.
43. A COMPANION TO JUSTINIAN’S INSTITUTES 168 (Ernest Metzger ed., 1998).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 169.
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3071 (2016) (“A compromise is a contract whereby
the parties, through concessions made by one or more of them, settle a dispute or
an uncertainty concerning an obligation or other legal relationship.”).
47. Id. art. 2660 (“Exchange is a contract whereby each party transfers to the
other the ownership of a thing other than money.”).
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time48 and an agreement to give property to another under the obligation
to pay an estimated price or return the goods,49 respectively.
F. The Relevance of the Roman System for Louisiana Law
In many ways, the Roman system of contract classification is an
interesting historical vestige that seems only slightly relevant to Louisiana
law. Surely, there are no contracts litteris in Louisiana law. The stipulatio
may perhaps be an ancestor of many Louisiana contracts, but no longer
exists in any recognizable form today. Contracts re and consensual
contracts, however, still have some saliency, not in terms of their
enforceability but in terms of their classification. Consensual contracts,
such as sale, are enforceable as a sale even before the price is paid or the
thing delivered, which are subsequent obligations imposed on the buyer
and seller, respectively.50 Contracts re, such as deposit, however, still
require both “delivery of the thing” and consent to be enforceable as a
deposit.51 Before the thing is delivered, Louisiana law notes that “there is
no contract of deposit, but there may be a variety of legal relations between
the parties,” such as “offers to enter into a contract of deposit,” a contract
to deposit, or “unilateral promises to deliver or to accept a thing in
deposit.”52
Modern Louisiana law, like Roman law, also recognizes the existence
of consensual contracts. In fact, all of Louisiana contract law in general—
unlike Roman contract law—is founded upon consent. Article 1927 makes
clear that “[a] contract is formed by the consent of the parties.”53 Although
unnecessary now, the nominate contracts of sale and lease still contain the
definitional vestige of consent. A sale contract is formed upon agreement
of price and thing, even before the price is paid or the thing delivered.54
Moreover, “[t]he consent of the parties as to the thing and the rent is

48. 4 THE DIGEST OF JUSTINIAN bk. 43, ch. 26, para. 1 (Alan Watson trans. &
ed., 1998) [hereinafter DIGEST].
49. For discussion of this innominate contract, as well as extensive discussion
of other Roman contracts and their development, see REINHARD ZIMMERMANN,
THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION
535–36 (1992).
50. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2475, 2549.
51. Id. art 2929.
52. Id. art. 2929 cmt. b.
53. Id. art. 1927.
54. Id. art. 2456; INSTITUTES OF ROMAN LAW BY GAIUS § 3.139 (Edward
Poste trans., E.A. Whittuck ed., 4th ed. 1904); DIGEST, supra note 48, bk. 18, ch.
1, para. 2.
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essential . . . for a contract of lease.”55 Although the foundational article
on mandate no longer specifies the consent element,56 the comments to the
articles on partnership still make clear that “[t]he consensual element
underlying the creation of a partnership distinguishes it.”57
Just as in Roman law, mutuum, commodatum, depositum, and pignus
in Louisiana law still require delivery of the thing for the existence of the
transaction. A loan for consumption under Louisiana law is “a contract by
which a person, the lender, delivers consumable things to another, the
borrower, who binds himself to return to the lender an equal amount of
things of the same kind and quality.”58 Similarly, a loan for use “is a
gratuitous contract by which a person, the lender, delivers a
nonconsumable thing to another, the borrower, for him to use and
return.”59 Likewise, a deposit is “a contract by which a person, the
depositor, delivers a movable thing to another person, the depositary, for
safekeeping under the obligation of returning it to the depositor upon
demand.”60 Similarly, the contract of pledge requires delivery of the thing
pledged, unless the object is not a corporeal moveable.61 Prior law also
made clear that “[t]he pledge is a contract by which one debtor gives
something to his creditor as security for his debt.”62
Although innominate contracts exist under Louisiana law, they are not
the innominate contracts of Roman law. Innominate contracts under
Louisiana law are truly contracts “with no special designation,”63 such as
an agreement to provide a home and burial for a relative in exchange for
the transfer of property.64 In Roman law, the term “innominate” contracts
refers not to the contracts themselves, which were quite nominate, but to

55. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2668.
56. Id. arts. 2998–3032; see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2988 (1870) (“The
contract of mandate is completed only by the acceptance of the mandatary.”).
57. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2801 cmt. a (2016); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 2805
(1870) (“Partnerships must be created by consent of the parties.”).
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2904 (2016).
59. Id. art. 2891.
60. Id. art. 2926.
61. Id. art. 3149.
62. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133 (1870).
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1914 (2016).
64. Thielman v. Gahlman, 44 So. 123 (La. 1907). At the time of Domat, the
consignment contract also appears to have been innominate. “There are likewise
some covenants which have no proper name; as if one person gives to another a
thing to sell at a certain price, on condition that he shall keep to himself whatever
he gets over and above the price that is fixed.” 1 JEAN DOMAT, THE CIVIL LAW IN
ITS NATURAL ORDER 162 (William Strahan trans., Luther S. Cushing ed., 1850).
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the category of contracts that had no name but were subsumed together in
a rather rag-tag group.65
All of these classificatory systems, however, operate today in the
background. Although Louisiana law does not distinguish contracts based
upon these terms, an understanding of their origins is helpful in assessing
consequences and evaluating definitions. A more general theory of
contract formation has displaced these categories, but new categories have
arisen to take the place of the old ones.
II. MEDIEVAL LAW AND THE ABANDONMENT OF THE ROMAN SYSTEM
Given the disappearance of the Roman system in the void of the dark
ages, little development occurred on the Roman classification system after
Justinian. With the re-engagement of Roman law and the rediscovery of
the Digest in the thirteenth century, hope for further refinement began
anew. Medieval jurists and even early modern ones tried for some time to
retain the Roman system of classification,66 even though the Roman
system of classification was unquestionably lacking and had been roundly
criticized.67 The eventual disappearance, some have suggested, was not
due to the impracticability of the Roman system but to the
reconceptualization and reorganization of contract law by the late
scholastics.68
It is true that the absence of a general theory of contract likely put
pressure on the Roman system to evolve, but recall that the stipulatio was
flexible enough to adapt to any situation.69 Additionally, the Roman
reluctance to enforce innominate contracts probably was not a significant
obstacle for the medieval jurists because such contracts were routinely
made enforceable by blessing them with the notarial seal.70 But as flexible
as the stipulatio may have been, it still involved what many would likely
65. Although even in Roman times, it was recognized that “it is implicit in
the nature of reality that there are more types of transactions than names for them.”
DIGEST, supra note 48, bk. 19, ch. 5, para. 4, at 217.
66. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 290.
67. Weir, supra note 1, at 1615 (“If we were to imagine all possible defects—
in [the Roman] division, in their nomenclature—it would be difficult to
exaggerate them.” (quoting 3 JEREMY BENTHAM, General View of a Complete
Code of Laws, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 155, 191 (Russel & Russel,
Inc. 1962) (1843))).
68. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 287.
69. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 30.
70. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 291; BIRKS, supra note 21, at
30–31.
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have regarded as an “irksome” formality, “however slight and simple.”71
Moreover, the stipulatio was stricti iuris, meaning that the contract was
“judged according to strict law” and did not have the benefit of more
equitable remedies that would become important and that might be
available to contracts governed by bona fides (good faith).72
Scholars have noted that the late scholastic philosophers rejected the
Roman scheme of distinguishing between consensual contracts and real
contracts and between nominate and innominate ones as a classificatory
system not relevant to modern law and useful only in explaining Roman
law.73 Rather, they “explained the binding force of promises in terms of
the Aristotelian virtues of promise-keeping, liberality, and commutative
justice.”74 The important consideration became not so much finding the
right classification or fact scenario for enforcing a contract, but rather
whether the parties had made promises to be bound.75 This, of course, was
not news to the medieval canon lawyers who had long believed that
breaking a promise was wrong, but the Roman law had historically denied
a legal remedy for promise-breaking, unless it otherwise fell within one of
the recognized and allowable forms for contracting.76 As Jim Gordley has
aptly observed,
The Roman rules about which contracts were binding when were
dismissed as matters of Roman private law, and eventually, by
legislation or judicial decision, most of them vanished. The late
scholastics developed a theory based on Aristotelian ideas of
voluntary action . . . The distinguished two basic types of
contracts: contracts to make a gift, which were intended to enrich
the other party, and were acts of the Aristotelian virtue of
liberality; and contracts to exchange, which were voluntary acts
of commutative justice requiring equality so that at the moment of
the transaction, neither party was enriched at the other’s
expense.77

71. BIRKS, supra note 21, at 57.
72. Id.
73. JAMES GORDLEY, THE JURISTS: A CRITICAL HISTORY 96 (2013)
[hereinafter GORDLEY, JURISTS].
74. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 82.
75. GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 2, at 291.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 287.
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This distinction between acts of liberality and acts of exchange or
commutative justice were used to “restructure the law of particular
contracts.”78 For transactions involving an exchange:
[T]he parties had to exchange at a just price—a price that enriched
neither party at the other’s expense. . . . If one of the parties had
wanted to enrich the other at his own expense, he would have
made a gift. The very nature of a contract of exchange is that the
parties exchange equivalents. . . . According to Aquinas, relief was
given only for large deviations from the just price, because human
law could not command all acts of virtue.79
Grotius, and later Puffendorf, continued the debate and discussions on
this topic that had animated the late scholastics.80 Grotius sets his work in
opposition to François de Connan, who maintained that “no obligation is
created by those agreements which do not contain an exchange of
considerations.”81 Grotius rejected this view and instead emphasized the
role of the internal will or desire in serving as the primary forces behind
agreements.82 Puffendorf noted the debate between Grotius and “Connanus
the Civilian,”83 and endorsed the position of Grotius. Puffendorf agreed that
“consent” was the hallmark principle for the binding effect of promises and
pacts. He noted that:
Since the regular effect of pacts and promises is to abridge and
refrain our liberty, . . . there can be no better argument to hinder a
man from complaining of this burden, than to alledge, [sic] that he
took it upon him by his own free will and consent, when he had
full power to refute it.84
In short, the medieval period was important in reorienting contract law.
Contract law slowly but unquestionably moved from the Roman casuistic
system of specific types of classes of contracts to a philosophically oriented
system based upon promise keeping, justice, and the importance of the will.
The Roman concepts, however, were not completely abandoned. Rather,
78. GORDLEY, JURISTS, supra note 73, at 97.
79. Id. at 97.
80. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 75.
81. 2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES 328 (Francis W.
Kelsey trans., 1925) (1625).
82. Id. at 329.
83. 1 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, OF THE LAW OF NATURE AND NATIONS 51 (Basil
Kennett trans., 1719).
84. Id. at 54.
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“[a] synthesis between Roman law and Aristotelian and Thomistic moral
philosophy was finally achieved in the sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.”85
III. THE FRENCH SYSTEM OF CLASSIFICATION
Given the philosophical reorientation that occurred in medieval times,
by the time the French Code Civil was drafted, the treatise writers who
were heavily relied upon by the French all conclusively stated that
“consent” was the hallmark of a contract. Domat makes clear that
“[c]ovenants are perfected by the mutual consent of the parties, which they
give to one another reciprocally.”86 Similarly, Pothier unequivocally states
that a contract is a kind of an agreement, and “[a]n agreement is the
consent of two or more persons.”87 Other scholars have long observed the
influence of Domat and Pothier in orienting the Code Civil around a
concept of “voluntarism” but noted that the true binding force of a contract
for them both appears not to be the autonomy of the human will, but to be
something external to man—such as an obligation of conscience to uphold
one’s word.88 Indeed, this mindset is evident in the Code Civil, which
notes that contractual freedom is subordinated not only to law but to public
order and good morals.89 Pothier, like the scholastic philosophers before
him, rejects the Roman classification of contracts. Still, however, he sees
the need to classify contracts, even in the face of a general theory of
contracts. Pothier explains that in France, contracts can be divided into
five classes: (1) synallagmatic and unilateral; (2) consensual and real; (3)
contracts of mutual interest, beneficence, or mixed contracts; (4) principal
and accessory; and (5) those regulated by the civil law and those regulated
by “mere natural justice.”90

85. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 69.
86. 1 DOMAT, supra note 64, at 163.
87. 1 ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS
OR CONTRACTS 3 (William David Evans trans., 1826).
88. JACQUES GHESTIN, TRAITE DE DROIT CIVIL: LA FORMATION DU CONTRAT
40 (3d ed. 1993).
89. Id. at 39–40.
90. POTHIER, supra note 87, at 7–10. For an excellent discussion of the
history of unilateral and bilateral contracts, see MICHEL SÉJEAN, LA
BILATÉRALIZATION DU CAUTIONNEMENT? LE CARACTÉRE UNILATÉRAL DU
CAUTIONNEMENT À L’ÉPREUVE DES NOUVELLES CONSTRAINTES DU CRÉANCIER
389 (2011) (arguing that the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts
originates not in Roman Law, but in Byzantine law).
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Despite the importance of Pothier’s influence, not all of his
classification scheme was actually adopted by the drafters of the French
Code Civil. Articles 1102 through 1106 present three separate classes of
contracts: (1) bilateral and unilateral, which is distinguished based upon
whether the parties assume reciprocal obligations;91 (2) commutative and
aleatory, based upon what is given—either the equivalent in the case of a
commutative contract or the chance of gain or loss in the context of an
aleatory one;92 and (3) contracts of beneficence and onerous contracts,
distinguished upon what each party gives.93 The classification system
adopted by the French Code Civil begins the title on contracts, which
“comprises all types of contracts” and is necessary to show which types of
Roman contracts the French Code Civil accepted and which ones it
rejected as not useful.94
A contract is synallagmatic or bilateral when the parties assume
reciprocal obligations, such as in a sale, lease, or partnership.95 It is unilateral
when only one party takes on an obligation, such as in a loan for use,
mandate, or deposit.96 Toullier, however, is critical of this distinction,
labeling it “imperfect” and suggesting that some unilateral contracts impose
reciprocal obligations as well.97 Those cases, however, involve obligations
that are not principal obligations of the contract and do not arise immediately
at the time of contract formation.98 Other scholars have observed that this
intermediate classification of imperfect synallagmatic contracts has been
recognized by the courts and results from a contract that was “originally
unilateral . . . [but] becomes synallagmatic when the other party became
liable during the life of the contracts.” This occurs when a gratuitous
depositary expends money to preserve the property for which
reimbursement will be due.99 In these obligations, the obligation on the
part of one party is only “eventual or accidental” and often does not exist
at all.100
91.
92.
93.
94.

C. CIV. arts. 1102, 1103 (Fr.).
Id. art. 1104.
Id. arts. 1105, 1106.
3 P.A. FENET, RECUEIL COMPLET DES TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES DU
CODE CIVIL 222 (1856).
95. 3 C.B.M. TOULLIER, LE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS SUIVANT L’ORDRE DU
CODE 256 (1823).
96. Id. at 256.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Denis Tallon, Contract Law, in INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 208
(George Bermann & Etienne Picard eds., 2012).
100. 3 TOULLIER, supra note 95, at 256.
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Commutative and aleatory contracts, on the other hand, have a
different distinction. Commutative contracts are those in which what is
given or done is regarded as the equivalent of what is given or done by the
reciprocal party, such as in a sale or exchange.101 In aleatory contracts,
however, “the equivalent consists in the chance of gain or of loss for each
of the parties, after an eventual uncertainty.”102 Contracts of insurance are
a classic example of an aleatory contract.103 Toullier is also critical of this
distinction, noting that it is of little utility but explaining that in
commutative contracts equivalent things can be exchanged, equivalent
acts can be performed, or equivalent things can be given in exchange for
acts. In this sense, he notes that an aleatory contract can be commutative
because one party exchanges a thing, such as money, in return for a
hope.104
Finally, contracts can be onerous or gratuitous. Gratuitous contracts
are those in which one of the parties procures from the other a purely
gratuitous advantage, such as in a deposit, mandate, or donation.105
Onerous contracts are those in which each of the parties gives or does
something, such as in a sale, lease, or loan for interest.106 Toullier also
suggests a blend of these categories is possible and notes that some
contracts are mixed, such as when the motives could be partly onerous and
partly gratuitous, as when a donation is subject to a charge.107
Writing in the mid-nineteenth century, Demolombe also follows the
French Code Civil but adds two extra categories: (1) nominate and
innominate; and (2) principal and accessory.108 The former category is
hinted at by article 1107 of the French Code Civil, which discusses those
contracts that “have a proper denomination” and “those that have not.”
The latter category of principal and accessory is a doctrinal innovation.
Modern French scholarship109 recognizes a general category of
consensual contracts and exceptional ones in which delivery of object is

101. Id.
102. Id. at 257.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. 12 C. DEMOLOMBE, COURS DE CODE CIVIL 6 (1868).
109. In the projet for the reform of French obligations law, many of the above
doctrinal categories, in addition to the ones in the current French Code Civil, are
proposed—for example, consensual, solemn, and real; mutual and adhesionary;
and contracts of successive and instantaneous execution. See PROJET DE REFORME
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also required—such as real contracts—and those in which consent is
subordinated to some solemnity—such as solemn contracts.110 Still other
divisions include contracts of mutual agreement (gré a gré) and contracts of
adhesion;111 individual and collective contracts;112 contracts of instantaneous
execution and those of successive execution;113 civil contracts and
commercial ones;114 and professional ones and consumer contracts.115
The practical significance of these many classifications is not obvious,
and the importance of each division varies. Planiol suggests that the
difference between bilateral and unilateral contracts is “very important”;116
that the distinction between onerous and gratuitous ones is “somewhat
delicate”;117 and that the distinction between commutative and aleatory
ones is “hardly of any importance.”118
The sheer number of categories seems to have expanded to such an
extent that one may long for the old Roman system. That being said, some
commentators have attempted to explain the function of this categorization,
which, given the advent of the will theory, now no longer has anything to
do with the enforceability vel non of the contract. Bilateral contracts differ
from unilateral ones as to the benefit from the laws pertaining to
interdependence of obligations, such as the defense of non-performance.119
Gratuitous contracts differ from onerous ones in that they generally
impose a lesser degree of care and often require a higher degree of form
in formation.120 Gratuitous contracts also are more easily challenged
through the Paulienne action and more easily rescindable due to mistake
as to identity of the other party.121 Commutative contracts are
distinguishable from aleatory ones insofar as commutative contracts are
DU DROIT DES CONTRACTS, DU REGIME GENERAL ET DE LA PREUVE DES
OBLIGATIONS arts. 1104–1110 (2015).
110. 8 ROBERT BEUDANT & PAUL LEREBOURS-PICEONNIÈRE, COURS DE
DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 35–37 (2d ed. 1936).

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
Id.
ALAIN BÉNABENT, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 6 (9th ed. 2003).
Id. at 7.
MARCEL PLANIOL & GEORGE RIPERT, OBLIGATIONS, in 6 TRAITÉ
PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS (2d ed. 1952) (Author’s translation).
117. Id. at 41.
118. Id. at 554 (with respect to lesion).
119. Tallon, supra note 99, at 208–10; BÉNABENT, supra note 114, at 1–7;
BARRY NICHOLAS, THE FRENCH LAW OF CONTRACT 38–47 (2d ed. 1992).
120. Tallon, supra note 99, at 208.
121. NICHOLAS, supra note 119, at 45; 2 GEORGE RIPERT & JEAN BOULANGER,
TRAITÉ DE DROIT CIVIL 34 (1957).
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subject to rescission on the basis of lesion.122 Nominate contracts differ
from innominate ones insofar as special rules, in addition to the general rules
of contract, govern their operation.123 Consensual, real, and solemn
contracts can be distinguished from one another because consent alone is
sufficient to form a consensual contract whereas real or solemn contracts
require either delivery or an extra formality for enforceability.124
“Consensual contracts are the rule whereas real and solemn contracts are the
exception.”125 Adhesionary contracts, unlike those of mutual agreement,
may be subject to special rules under the Consumer Code, Insurance Code,
and Labor Code.126 Individual and collective contracts differ from each
other in terms of whose consent is necessary for its formation. Individual
consent is required for ordinary individual contracts, but collective ones can
be formed even without the consent of each party affected.127 Instantaneous
contracts are different from successive ones because the latter contains
special rules on termination.128 Professional contracts are different from
consumer ones because consumer ones are subject to special protective
consumer law.129 Finally, commercial contracts, unlike civil ones, are
subject to special rules, among which is a relaxation of the evidence rules
for proof of contracts.130 In the end, the French system of classification is
complex but does appear to have some relevance in the modern day. It
does not, like the Roman system, dictate enforceability, but it may, in some
instances, dictate outcome.
IV. THE LOUISIANA CIVIL CODE’S CLASSIFICATION OF CONTRACTS
Relying heavily on French law, the Louisiana Civil Code sets up a
number of dichotomies for classification of contracts. The juxtaposition of
various types of contracts, such as unilateral and bilateral, often provides
insight into understanding the opposite sides of the juridical terrain. In
other instances, however, the dichotomy is less clear, such as the
distinction between commutative and aleatory contracts. The provisions in

122. Tallon, supra note 99, at 208–09.
123. Id. at 209.
124. Id.
125. BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIERE, supra note 110, at 35 (Author’s
translation).
126. Tallon, supra note 99, at 209.
127. F.H. LAWSON ET AL., AMOS & WALTON’S INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH
LAW 153 (2d ed. 1963).
128. Tallon, supra note 99, at 209.
129. YVAINE BUFFELAN-LANORE & VIRGINE LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, DROIT
CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 254–57 (13th ed. 2012).
130. Tallon, supra note 99, at 209.
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Louisiana law have arrived by way of France but do contain “some curious
anomalies.”131 In the Digest of 1808, the provisions on classifying
contracts appear to be almost verbatim copies of the provisions of the Code
Napoleon,132 although the de La Vergne manuscript cites the influence of
Pothier, which seems obvious at least in later revisions.133
A dramatic expansion from the French system of five articles to one
that included thirteen articles and new categories of “certain” and
“independent” contracts occurred in 1825 and was perpetuated under the
1870 Code.134 From whence came the new categories added in 1825 is still
a mystery. The redactors mention in the projet to the revision that the goal
was to correct inaccuracies and to provide “a better plan of distribution.”135
Although Batiza references Pothier as the source for the new articles and
categories,136 Pothier’s influence is not evident.137 Neither Domat nor
Toullier, two other French scholars from whom the redactors freely
borrowed, seem fruitful either.138 Whatever their source, the classificatory
schemes in 1825 were paired in terms of their “parties,” their “substance,”
their “motive,” and their “effects.”139 When considering the parties in the
contract, one party “does, or engages to do or not to do,” while the other
receives the performance.140 When the “latter party make[s] no express
agreement on his part,” the contracts is unilateral.141 “[W]hen the parties
expressly enter into mutual engagements,” the contract is bilateral.142

131. Smith, supra note 20, at 15.
132. Compare LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3–7 (1808), with C. CIV. arts. 1102–1107
(1804) (Fr.).
133. A REPRINT OF MOREAU LISLET’S COPY OF THE DIGEST OF THE CIVIL
LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF ORLEANS (1808): THE DE LA VERGNE
VOLUME (Claitor’s Publ’g Div. 1971).
134. A Republication of the Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825, 1
LA. LEGAL ARCHIVES 228–29 (1937).
135. Id. at 227; LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 91, at 143.
136. See Rodolfo Batiza, The Louisiana Civil Code of 1808: Its Actual Sources
and Present Relevance, 46 TUL. L. REV. 4, 71 (1971).
137. See, e.g., POTHIER, supra note 87 (containing no mention of independent
or certain contracts).
138. Rodolfo Batiza, The Actual Sources of the Louisiana Projet of 1823: A
General Analytical Survey, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1, 70–71 (1972); see also A.N.
Yiannopoulos, The Civil Codes of Louisiana, 1 CIV. L. COMMENTS. 1, 12 (2008).
139. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1765, 1767, 1772, 1775 (1870).
140. Id. art. 1765.
141. Id.
142. Id.
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When the “substance” of a contract is considered, contracts are “either
commutative or independent, principal or accessory.”143
The motive of the parties serves as the basis for distinguishing
gratuitous contracts from onerous ones.144 When the cause of a contract is
to “benefit the person with whom it is made, without any profit or advantage,
received or promised as a consideration for it,” it is gratuitous.145 The
contract is onerous when something is “given or promised as a consideration
for” the performance, even if what is given or promised is of “unequal”
value.146
Finally, considering “effects,” contracts are either certain or aleatory.147
A contract is aleatory when it “depends on an uncertain event,” and it is
certain “when the thing to be done is supposed to depend on the will of the
party, or when in the usual course of events it must happen in the manner
stipulated.”148
The modern Louisiana Civil Code, as amended in the 1984 Obligations
revision, abandoned the expansion created by the 1825 revision and returned
to an approach more similar to the French Code Civil. The reason for the
compression, just as the reason for the expansion, remains unclear. What is
clear is that Louisiana law now contains a series of five sets or types of
contracts: unilateral and bilateral; onerous and gratuitous; commutative and
aleatory; principal and accessory; and nominate and innominate. Most
obviously, the distinctions between commutative and independent
contracts, as well as the contrast between aleatory and certain contracts,
have disappeared. Rather, commutative and aleatory seem to have returned
to their historical place as counterparts. Regardless of the origin of the
change, each of these distinctions will be considered below, but each is not
of equal importance. Some of the distinctions are necessary for certain
contractual defenses, such as dissolution or nonperformance. Others are
important for assessing standards of care, degrees of form, and norms of
capacity. Still others are subject to entire legal regimes by virtue of their
special nomination. Finally, some cannot even exist without supporting
contracts or legal relations to reinforce their existence.

143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. art. 1767.
Id. art. 1772.
Id. art. 1773.
Id. art. 1774.
Id. art. 1775.
Id. art. 1776.
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A. Unilateral and Bilateral
One important distinction between contracts under the Louisiana Civil
Code is that between unilateral and bilateral contracts, a distinction under
the 1870 Code based upon the parties. Like the French classification, a
contract is unilateral when only one party accepts an obligation and the
other party does not assume a reciprocal one.149 On the other hand, a
bilateral or synallagmatic contract150 gives rise to reciprocal obligations on
behalf of both parties to the contract.151 This dichotomy in Louisiana does
not admit of gradations, as neither Louisiana law nor Louisiana doctrine
recognizes the French concept of imperfectly bilateral contracts. Rather, a
contract is unilateral or bilateral based upon the essence or nature of the
obligations entailed in the contract. Donations, mandates, and loans, are
classic cases of unilateral contracts, whereas sales, leases, and exchanges
are classic instances of bilateral contracts.
Donations are unilateral because the donor is obligated to deliver the
thing to the donee, but the donee has no reciprocal obligation.152 Mandates
are unilateral for a similar reason: because the mandatary must “transact
one or more affairs for the principal,” who does not assume a reciprocal
obligation toward the mandatary.153 Loans for use are also unilateral
because the borrower must “use and return” the thing lent, but the lender
is not reciprocally obligated.154 At this point, the Anglo-American lawyer
149. A unilateral contract in Louisiana is not to be confused with a unilateral
juridical act. Juridical act has been defined as “a licit act intended to have legal
consequences.” See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 cmt. b (2016); see also SAÚL
LITVINOFF & W. THOMAS TÊTE, LOUISIANA LEGAL TRANSACTIONS: THE CIVIL
LAW OF JURIDICAL ACTS 133–90 (1969).
150. Bilateral contracts are sometimes known by their Greek name,
synallagmatic contracts, from the Greek word synallagama, meaning “exchange.”
Although the Louisiana Civil Code uses the term bilateral in its classificatory
scheme, it also employs the term synallagmatic in certain specific contexts. There
is no distinction, however, between the two terms, bilateral and synallagmatic.
151. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1908 (2016); see also Kaplan v. Whitworth, 40 So.
723, 724 (La. 1906) (“The language of the instrument imposes no obligation upon
the plaintiff but seems carefully to avoid doing so. The contract, if any there be,
is therefore, not bilateral.”).
152. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1544; see also id. art. 1551 cmt. b (stating
that delivery is not required “if the acceptance is made by means other than
corporeal possession,” presumably because the transfer of ownership via the
acceptance takes the place of delivery, as in the case of sales); see, e.g., id. art.
2477.
153. Id. art. 2989.
154. Id. art. 2891.
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is almost hardwired to resist with the reasonable criticism that loans under
the above dichotomy seem unilateral only if they are executed rather than
executory. In other words, if one considers a loan transaction at a point in
time before the money or thing is lent, then each party does indeed appear
to have reciprocal obligations—the lender to lend the money and the
borrower to repay it (either with or without interest). Although such a
criticism is plausible, it misunderstands the conceptual basis of the
contract of loan. Both under Roman law and Louisiana law, a loan contract
is not a consensual contract like a sale or lease. Rather a loan contract is a
real contract or a contract re and thus not a contract of loan at all until a
thing is lent. Barry Nicholas reminds us that:
In the Roman view the real contracts came into existence when the
thing (res) was delivered to the borrower, who then came under an
obligation to return it (or, in a loan for consumption, its equivalent)
at the appointed time. In terms of the distinction which we are
discussing this is a unilateral contract, the borrower having a duty
(to return the money) and the lender a correlative right, but not vice
versa. Until delivery of the thing there is no contract . . . .155
Similarly, in Louisiana, the very definition of a loan requires delivery
of the thing lent.156 Parties are, of course, free to enter into the consensual
contract of a “contract to lend,” whereby each party by virtue of the
manifestations of their consent agrees to accept mutual or reciprocal
obligations.157 At Roman law, however, such an agreement would not “be
a contract because it is not one of the four ‘consensual’ contracts (and is
not clothed in the form of the stipulatio).”158 Thus, an executory loan is
not a bilateral loan because it is not a loan at all, although it may be a
contract to lend.
Although the distinction between unilateral and bilateral contracts in
Louisiana law is not as significant as in French law, distinctions do exist,
primarily in the areas of default and consent. With respect to putting an
obligor in default for failure to perform, an obligor in a bilateral contract
may not be put in default unless the obligor of the other has performed or
is ready to perform his own obligation.159 For example, in Retail

155. NICHOLAS, supra note 119, at 41.
156. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2891, 2904.
157. Cf. id. art. 2891 cmt. b.
158. NICHOLAS, supra note 119, at 41.
159. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1993 (limiting application of this article to the “case
of reciprocal obligations”); see also id. cmt. b (“Reciprocal obligations are those
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Merchants Ass’n v. Forrester, the court appropriately held that a hospital
could not put a patient in default and seek full payment from him for medical
services when it failed to perform its obligation under the contract of timely
notifying the patient’s health insurer.160 Similarly, nonperformance by one
party to a bilateral contract, unlike a unilateral one, gives the other a right to
seek dissolution of the contract. For example, if a lessee “fails to pay the
rent when due, the lessor may . . . dissolve the lease.”161 Similarly, “[i]f the
buyer fails to pay the price, the seller may sue for dissolution of the sale.”162
In Madere v. Cole, the seller of dogs was “entitled to sue” the purchaser of
a puppy “to dissolve the sale” when the sale was perfected through
agreement and the buyer failed to pay the price.163 In the context of a
unilateral contract, such as a donation, however, dissolution is not the
appropriate remedy for failure to deliver the thing donated, as confection
of the contract through acceptance transfers “the ownership or other real
right in the thing given.”164 Rather, the donee could sue to compel
discovery, but dissolution of the donation hardly seems to achieve the
donee’s goal if the donor fails to perform.
B. Onerous and Gratuitous (and Mixed)
Perhaps the most important distinction between types of contracts
exists between gratuitous and onerous contracts. Unlike unilateral and
bilateral contracts, gratuitous and onerous ones are distinguished based
upon their cause.165 Gratuitous contracts are those in which one party
obligates himself without doing so to obtain any advantage in return.166 By
contrast, an onerous contract exists when each party assumes an obligation
to obtain an advantage in exchange for his obligations.167 A donation, the
purpose of which is to enrich another with no expectation of return, is a
classic case of a gratuitous contract, whereas a sale, in which a thing is
given in exchange for a price in money, is the typical onerous one. Unlike
the characterization of bilateral and unilateral, “[w]hether a contract is an
onerous contract or gratuitous depends in the final analysis on its cause,”168
that arise from bilateral or synallagmatic contracts.”); LITVINOFF, supra note 20,
§ 95, at 150.
160. Retail Merchs. Ass’n v. Forrester, 114 So. 3d 1175, 1180 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
161. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2704.
162. Id. art. 2561.
163. Madere v. Cole, 424 So. 2d 1125, 1127 (La. Ct. App. 1982).
164. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1551.
165. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1772 (1870).
166. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1910 (2016).
167. Id. art. 1909.
168. Smith, supra note 20, at 5.
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not upon the parties to the contract. In the words of the late obligations
scholar J. Denson Smith:
If a contractant desires to confer a benefit by way of gratuity the
resulting contract is gratuitous. Where he is not so moved the
contract is onerous. Certain special contracts such as the loan of
money without interest, the non-remunerative suretyship, mandate
and deposit, and the loan for use are therefore characterized as
gratuitous. In all these cases a benefit is conferred without
anything being asked for or received in return.169
The importance of cause as a basis for classifying contracts as
gratuitous or onerous is readily apparent in the jurisprudence. Nowhere
perhaps is the importance of cause more evident than in Larose v. Morgan,
where the court concluded that the transfer of a house from one party to
his son-in-law due to prior services rendered and money advanced, rather
than for reasons of beneficence, created an onerous contract rather than a
gratuitous one.170 Finally, in Townsend v. Urie, the court found that the
plaintiff’s letter to the defendant constituted acceptance of his gratuitous
offer of a bonus and thus confected an enforceable unilateral and gratuitous
contract.171 Although the acceptance letter did contain “something in the
nature of a compromise not to pursue legal action in lieu of enforcing the
existing unilateral gratuitous contract,” the letter did not constitute a counter
offer, as “the cause of the contract was [the defendant’s] generosity and
desire to reward [the plaintiff].”172
Although the concept of cause is well known in Louisiana law as the
“reason”173 or, historically, the “motive” for entering into a contract,174
ascertaining a party’s cause often poses problems for courts. The subjective
will, although important and often essential in ascertaining contract
formation, issues of error, and contract interpretation, must yield in some
instances to objective declarations. “A will that is purely subjective,
meaning that it was never expressed, is irrelevant in the eyes of the law.”175
On the other hand, sometimes an external manifestation does not match
the subjective or internal intent. Consequently, a holistic view of the will
is necessary and important for purposes of our law. In other words, “a
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Id.
Larose v. Morgan, 252 So. 2d 766, 769 (La. Ct. App. 1971).
Townsend v. Urie, 800 So. 2d 11, 17 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 18.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967 (2016).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1896 (1870).
LITVINOFF & TÊTE, supra note 149, at 113.
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judge[] will have to take the act as one single phenomenon wherein a
certain intention—a subjective element—is thoroughly blended with a
certain utterance—an objective element.”176
The consequences of this classification in Louisiana law are multifold.
First, the requirement of consent is often relaxed in the context of
gratuitous contracts.177 In a remission, a gratuitous extinction of an
obligation,178 acceptance by the obligor is “always presumed unless the
obligor rejects the remission within a reasonable time.”179 Similarly,
although an authentic act is required for a donation inter vivos,180 an
acceptance can be made “subsequently in writing.”181 This conclusion was
bolstered by a recent holding that a “donee’s signature on the act of
donation is a sufficient writing to perfect the acceptance,” even though not
itself done in an authentic act.182
Second, gratuitous contracts usually impose a lower standard of care
than onerous ones.183 In the context of an onerous deposit—such as a
deposit contract in which the depositary receives compensation for his
services—the standard of care is an objective one of “diligence and
prudence.”184 If the deposit is gratuitous—such as a deposit contract in
which a depositary receives no compensation for his services—however,
the law imposes a lesser standard of care of the “same diligence and
prudence” as a person “uses for his own property.”185 The law on mandate
similarly imposes a general standard of diligence and prudence but then
allows a court to “reduce the amount of loss for which the mandatory is
liable” if the mandate is uncompensated or gratuitous.186 Ordinary
suretyships, or those that are not compensated, also benefit from being
“strictly construed in favor of the surety,”187 whereas the same is not the
case for commercial suretyships.
Third, the individual parties to the contract are presumed to be the
principal reason for entering into a gratuitous contract such as a donation.

176. Id. at 113.
177. LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 95, at 151.
178. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1888 & cmt. b (2016) (noting that a remission is “an
act gratuitous in principle”).
179. Id. art. 1890.
180. Id. art. 1541.
181. Id. art. 1544.
182. Wiedermann v. Wiedermann, 30 So. 3d 972 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
183. LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 100, at 169.
184. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2930.
185. Id.
186. Id. art. 3002.
187. Id. art. 3044.
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This presumption is important because errors as to “the person or the
qualities of the other party” may constitute an error as to cause,188 and thus
vitiate the consent necessary for a contract.189 If the contract is a gratuitous
one, such as a donation, “the presumption obtains that the person of the
intended obligee was the reason why the obligor bound himself.”190 French
law is the same on this matter. Scholars have noted that gratuitous
contracts are generally concluded “as a function of the person of the
beneficiary” and are thus annullable for error as to the person.191 Although
rescission of error as to the person is certainly possible in onerous
contracts,192 no such presumption exists in the context of an onerous
contract, such as a sale.
Fourth, gratuitous contracts are more easily annullable when made by
persons deprived of reason than are onerous contracts.193 The Louisiana
Civil Code provides that “[a] contract made by a noninterdicted person
deprived of reason at the time of contracting may be attacked after his
death, on the ground of incapacity, only when the contract is gratuitous.”194
An onerous contract made by such persons may be annulled only when “it
evidences lack of understanding, or was made within thirty days of his
death, or when application for interdiction was filed before his death.”195
Fifth, gratuitous contracts are easier for creditors to annul under the
revocatory action.196 That is, “[a]n oblige may attack a gratuitous contract”
made by an obligor that causes or increases his insolvency “whether or not
the other party knew that the contract would cause or increase the obligor’s
insolvency.”197 With respect to an onerous contract, however, an obligee

188. Id. art. 1950.
189. Id. art. 1949.
190. Id. art. 1950 cmt. d. But see id. art. 1479 cmt. e (“There is no intent to
create a right to challenge donations based on mistake alone.”).
191. BUFFELAN-LANORE & LARRIBAU-TERNEYRE, supra note 129, at 246.
192. See, e.g., Bischoff v. Bros. of the Sacred Heart, 416 So. 2d 348, 351 (La.
Ct. App. 1982).
193. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1926.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Compare id. art. 2039, with id. art. 2038. Of course, donations, as a subset
of gratuitous contracts, are even more specifically regulated from other unilateral
contracts. See id. art. 1541 (requiring the heightened form of an authentic act); id.
art. 1477 (imposing special capacity rules); id. art. 1519 (imposing special rules
on illicit conditions).
197. Id. art. 2039.
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can annul the contract only if the other party “knew or should have known
that the contract would cause or increase the obligor’s insolvency.”198
To aid in the classification of contracts, the Louisiana Civil Code,
unlike the French Code Civil, recognizes a sort of halfway house between
onerous and gratuitous contracts—those characterized by some scholars
as “mixed.” These “mixed” contracts are those “by which one of the
parties confers a benefit on the other, receiving something of inferior value
in return, . . . such as a donation subject to a charge.”199 Relying on
Toullier, the drafters of the 1825 Louisiana Civil Code enacted a
mathematical test for deciding when mixed motive transactions were
sufficiently onerous to be treated as onerous contracts or not onerous
enough, such that they should be treated as donations, despite some
element of onerosity.200 Thus, articles 1526 and 1527 provide that the rules
for donations do not apply when the donation is burdened with an
obligation or in recompense for a service, unless at the time of donation
the obligation or the service is less than two-thirds the value of the thing
given.201 For instance, a $10,000 donation that imposes a charge or
obligation valued at $7,000 is subject to the rules of onerous contracts, not
donations, because the value of the obligation exceeds two-thirds (i.e.,
$6,667) of the value of the $10,000 gift. This objective mathematical test
serves as a surrogate for cause, making the ascertaining of a person’s
subjective reason, motive, or cause unnecessary. As the late comparative
scholar John Dawson has noted, “[p]sychological probes are entirely
dispensed with where appraisal in economic terms is feasible and the
appraisal reveals that the outlay required by the charge is substantial as
compared with the value of the asset ‘given.’”202

198. Id. art. 2038. Exceptionally, an obligee can annul a contract of an obligor
that causes or increases his insolvency “with a person who did not know” that the
contract would do so, “but in that case that person is entitled to recover as much
as he gave to the obligor.” Id.
199. 2 MARCEL PLANIOL, TRAITE ELEMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL 9 (La. Law
Inst. trans., 1938). Stated succinctly, Professor Kathryn Lorio has explained that
there are “three types of inter vivos donations: gratuitous, onerous or
remunerative.” KATHRYN LORIO, SUCCESSION AND DONATIONS § 8.13, in 10
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 257 (2d ed. 2009). A “gratuitous donations is
made purely from liberality; the onerous donation is burdened with charges upon
the donee; and the remunerative donation is given to recompense the donee for
services rendered in the past.” Id.
200. LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 102, at 173–75.
201. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1526, 1527.
202. JOHN DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 105 (1980).
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This dichotomy—or perhaps trichotomy if “mixed” contracts are
included—is a comprehensive one. That is, a contract must be either
gratuitous, onerous, or mixed. It cannot then fall in the interstices of the
classification, as has sometimes been mistakenly held by courts.203 If
mixed, the predominate element must be ascertained under the above
standard, and the contract must then be subjected to the rules of either the
gratuitous regime or the onerous one.
1. Onerous v. Bilateral and Gratuitous v. Unilateral
The classificatory dichotomy of onerous and gratuitous, although
overlapping, is not the same as the dichotomy between bilateral and
unilateral contracts. In truth, all bilateral contracts are onerous.204 The very
nature of the reciprocal obligations of a bilateral contract is at the same
time evidence of the advantage each party obtains and thus the contract’s
onerosity.205 A contract, however, may be onerous without, at the same
time, being bilateral.206 A loan at interest serves as a good example of an
onerous, unilateral contract.207 In such a case, both parties have obtained
advantages—the borrower, the use of the thing loaned, and the lender, the
interest. The obligations of the parties once the loan has been extended,
however, are not reciprocal. Rather, the obligations are engendered solely
by the borrower and thus the contract is unilateral.208
Moreover, despite an apparent similarity in meaning, gratuitous
contracts are not the same as unilateral contracts. Although all gratuitous
contracts are unilateral, not all unilateral contracts are gratuitous. Loan for
use, loan for consumption, deposit, and pledge are all unilateral contracts
but may in fact be onerous as well as gratuitous. In all of these instances,
the contracts are unilateral and onerous when compensation is given to the
obligee. Because, however, no reciprocal obligation is assumed by the
lender, depositor, or pledgor once the thing has been loaned, deposited, or
203. In Moore v. Wilson, the court correctly held that the transfer of an interest
in immovable property for $10.00 was not a sale because the price was “out of all
proportion with the value of the thing sold” under article 2464. 772 So. 2d 373,
376 (La. Ct. App. 2000). The court continued, however, to invalidate the
transaction in its entirety and mistakenly held that the transfer was neither a sale
nor a donation because of the lack of donative or gratuitous intent. Id.
204. BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 110, at 32; DEMOLOMBE,
supra note 108, at 9; LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 95, at 152.
205. BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 110, at 32.
206. Id.
207. Id.; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 116, at 39; but see LITVINOFF, supra
note 20, § 95, at 152 (describing pre-revision law).
208. BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 110, at 32.
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pledged, the contracts are still unilateral.209 Loans without interest and
deposit and pledges for no compensation are both unilateral and gratuitous
because the service is rendered with no benefit in exchange.210
Although the Roman concept of mandate was always gratuitous,211 it
is not so in current law. French law departed from the Roman idea as far
back as 1804 and allowed a contract of mandate to be either onerous or
gratuitous.212 The Louisiana Civil Code recognizes the same: “The
contract of mandate may be either onerous or gratuitous.”213 The
presumption, however, is that mandate is gratuitous, unless the parties
agreed otherwise.214 In fact, the nearly universal position in the civil law
world today is that mandate can be either onerous or gratuitous.215 This
approach has been praised as the “wiser choice” to help keep the contract
of mandate useful and realistic in the modern day.216 In either case,
however, a mandate is a unilateral contract, even when compensation is
paid.
2. The Scope of Gratuitous Contracts
Donations are the classic case of gratuitous contracts, but the contract
of donation does not exhaust the category of gratuitous contracts. Loan for
use, deposit, remission, and mandate can be gratuitous when they are done
for no compensation. As gratuitous contracts, they are subject to the rules

209. Id.
210. Id.
211. DIGEST, supra note 48, bk. 17, ch. 1, para. 1 (“Mandatum nisi gratuitum
nullem est.”). The Romans thought it important to distinguish the gratuitous contract
of mandate from a similar arrangement in which compensation was paid, which
would be classified as locatio-conductio. Nevertheless, it was not uncommon for an
honorarium to be given in exchange for the exercise of the mandate and in later law
even a salarium. See generally ALAN WATSON, CONTRACT OF MANDATE IN ROMAN
LAW (1961); ZIMMERMANN, supra note 49, at 413–32.
212. C. CIV. art. 1986 (1804) (Fr.).
213. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2992 (2016).
214. Id. (“It is gratuitous in the absence of contrary agreement.”).
215. See, e.g., PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN LAW: MANDATE CONTRACTS art.
1:101(2)–(3), at 3 (Marco B.M. Loos & Odavia Bueno Díaz eds., 2013) (stating
that the principles “apply where the agent is to be paid a price, and with
appropriate adaptations, where the agent is not to be paid a price”); see also id. at
143–46 listing various countries.
216. Wendell H. Holmes & Symeon C. Symeonides, Representation, Mandate,
and Agency: A Kommentar on Louisiana’s New Law, 73 TUL. L. REV. 1087, 1121
(1999).
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for donations, such as revocation, with the exception of form.217
Donations, of course, by their nature are always gratuitous.218 The
Louisiana Civil Code defines a donation inter vivos as “a contract by
which a person, called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at present
and irrevocably, of the thing given in favor of another, called the donee,
who accepts it.”219 In addition to other particular rules for donations, the
form required is an “authentic act under the penalty of absolute nullity.”220
Charitable subscriptions, or charitable pledges, present difficult
practical problems, even though there is no theoretical reason to treat this
type of donation as different from other types of donations inter vivos.
After all, a charitable subscription is a gratuitous disposition of a thing—
here a promise or pledge221—in favor of a donee, who happens to be a
charity rather than a private person. Many systems, as a matter of policy,
desire to enforce charitable subscriptions even in the absence of a coherent
theory as to why. Louisiana is no exception.
Obviously, to be enforceable as a donation inter vivos, a charitable
pledge would need to be made via an authentic act. Unfortunately,
charities rarely employ notaries for these purposes, which rather obviously
would dissuade those inclined from making gifts. Nonetheless, charitable
subscriptions, despite the lack of necessary form, have long been held to
be enforceable in Louisiana. For example, in Baptist Hospital v. Cappel,
the court found enforceable a pledge card that read: “For a valuable
consideration, receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, and in
consideration of the subscription of others, I hereby subscribe.”222
Similarly, in Louisiana College v. Keller,223 the language of the pledge
card stated simply:
We, the subscribers, agree and bind ourselves to pay the sums
severally annexed to our names, to any person or persons who may
be appointed by the legislature of the State of Louisiana to receive
the same, in behalf of a college, which may be established in the
town of Jackson, East Feliciana. It is, however, expressly
217. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE art. 1890 cmt. b.
218. Id. art. 1468 (“A donation inter vivos is a contract by which a person,
called the donor, gratuitously divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the
thing, given in favor of another, called the done, who accepts it.” (emphasis
added)).
219. Id. art. 1468.
220. Id. art. 1541.
221. See id. art. 1468 cmt. c (noting that a thing can be an incorporeal, such as
a real right or obligation).
222. Baptist Hosp. v. Cappel, 129 So. 425, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1930).
223. La. Coll. v. Keller, 10 La. 164 (1836).
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understood, that no obligation is hereby created against the
subscribers, unless the said legislature do establish a college with
an endowment, in the said town, at their next session. And, if a
college be established, as aforesaid, we waive all informality in
this obligation; those who subscribe two hundred dollars or under
to pay in equal instalments [sic] of one and two years; those who
subscribe over two hundred dollars, to pay the amount of their
subscriptions in annual instalments [sic] of one hundred dollars,
subsequent to the passage of a bill relative to said institution.224
In both cases, the charitable subscriptions were found to be enforceable,
despite their failure to comply with the form prescribed for donations inter
vivos.
A charitable subscription or pledge undoubtedly could “induce the
other party to rely on it to his detriment.”225 But article 1967, which defines
detrimental reliance, rules out the possibility of enforcing a gratuitous
promise, such as a charitable pledge, made in the wrong form. That article
clearly states that “[r]eliance on a gratuitous promise made without
required formalities is not reasonable.”226 Unsurprisingly, the courts have
never used a detrimental reliance rationale for enforcing charitable
subscriptions.
Instead, Louisiana courts have engaged in a rationale that suggests that
charitable pledges are enforceable either because they are really onerous
contracts or because they are exempt from traditional form rules for
donations. The courts’ rationales are admittedly unclear. For example, in
Louisiana College, the Court suggested that a charitable subscription was
in fact an onerous contract. The Court stated that the donor of money for
the erection of a hospital may have done so under the expectation that he
would derive an “advantage . . . from the establishment of a college at his
own door, by which he would save great expense in the education of his
children.”227 On the other hand, the Court also made statements suggesting
that the subscription was not onerous but merely a gratuitous contract
exempt from the form rules for donations. In this vein, the Court suggested
that the donor’s motivation “may have been a spirit of liberality and a
desire to be distinguished as the patron of letters.”228 The Court then

224.
225.
226.
227.
228.

Id. at 164.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1967.
Id.
La. Coll., 10 La. at 167.
Id.
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confusingly continued by stating, “[i]n contracts of beneficence, the
intention to confer a benefit is a sufficient consideration.”229
Similarly, the court in Baptist Hospital acknowledged that the
charitable pledge made for the construction of a new nurses’ home is
enforceable but seemed equally confused as to why.230 At one point, the
court seemed to suggest that the pledge is onerous because the donor
received a benefit: “Defendant does not show that any benefit he expected
to receive from the new nurses’ home has been in any way lessened or that
he has been in any way injured by the change in plans; therefore, he is
bound by his pledge.”231 In another part of the opinion, however, the court
suggested that the contract was a purely gratuitous one:
[The defendant] testified that his purpose in making the pledge
was to prevent the standing of the training school being withdrawn
and thereby causing the ladies in training to lose the time they had
spent in training there. It was his kind feeling for the young ladies
in training and his generosity that caused him to sign the pledge.232
Thus, the language in the existing judicial opinions concerning
charitable subscriptions could reasonably lead one to conclude that courts
treat charitable pledges as enforceable either because (1) they view them
as onerous contracts exempt from traditional form requirements, or (2)
they view them as gratuitous contracts that are de facto exempt from the
form requirements for donations inter vivos. The Louisiana Supreme
Court, in dicta, seems to have endorsed the former rationale:
Close examination therefore reveals that the courts deciding such
cases found the promises to be onerous so that they might then be
enforced, since there was no writing requirement for the promises
at issue if they could be characterized as onerous, as opposed to
gratuitous promises.233
To say that the logic of treating a gratuitous promise as an onerous
contract is tortured is a vast understatement. First, it is hard to read cases
such as Baptist Hosptial and Louisiana College and find any significant
onerous component. The donors in both cases possibly made subscriptions
229. Id.
230. See Baptist Hosp. v. Cappel, 129 So. 425, 426 (La. Ct. App. 1930).
231. Id. at 427.
232. Id.
233. Morris v. Friedman, 663 So. 2d 19, 24 (La. 1995). For an informative
essay in support of the court’s position, see Thomas B. Lemann, Enforceability of
Charitable Pledges, 2 CIV. L. COMMENTS. 1 (2009).
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because they wanted to either have a “college at his own door” or a nurses’
home nearby.234 But even if that were true as a factual matter, this hardly
seems to be a significant enough degree of onerosity to make the entire
transaction onerous or to make the donor’s “cause” for making the
donation the close proximity of the institution. This is especially true in
the Baptist Hospital case where the court suggests that the “[d]efendant
does not show that any benefit he expected to receive . . . has been in any
way lessened” by the relocation of the nurses’ home.235
Second, the other reasons the courts offer for finding the contract to
be onerous simply make little sense. The Court in Louisiana College
suggests that the donor may have been motivated by the “desire to be
distinguished as the patron of letters.”236 Certainly, however, that is not an
onerous motive. No one would doubt that birthday gifts made by friends
or relatives are “purely gratuitous,” even if they are only made by the
desire to be distinguished as a good friend or beneficent relative of the
recipient. Certainly a contract is gratuitous even if a donor’s internal
motivation is less than 100% pure. Courts do not and should not inquire
into the quality of one’s mind when making an uncompensated gift. After
all, the very definition of a gratuitous contract is one in which one party is
benefited “without [the other] obtaining any advantage in return.”237
Psychological benefits of being known as a good mother, a good friend, or
a patron of letters are surely outside the scope of the benefits contemplated
by article 1910 of the Civil Code. If they were not, the category of
gratuitous contracts would arguably cease to exist altogether.
A better explanation for why charitable subscriptions are enforceable
is simply that they are a special form of gratuitous contract and thus that
they are exempt from the form requirements for donations inter vivos, just
as other gratuitous contracts are. This is not only faithful to the existing
jurisprudence on the topic of charitable pledges, but it is also more
logically defensible. Cases such as Baptist Hospital and Louisiana College
stand for the proposition that charitable subscriptions are enforceable
without using an authentic act. Having rejected their characterization as
onerous contracts, the explanation as to their enforceability must lie
elsewhere. Because these subscriptions are unquestionably gratuitous in
nature, the requirement of the authentic act exists only for transactions that
are traditionally characterized as donations inter vivos, not for all contracts
that are gratuitous in nature.238 Many types of gratuitous contracts are not
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.

La. Coll., 10 La. at 167; Baptist Hosp., 129 So. at 427.
Baptist Hosp., 129 So. at 427.
La. Coll., 10 La. at 167.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1910 (2016).
See id. art. 1541.
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subject to the form requirements for a donation inter vivos. For example,
a remission of debt is a gratuitous contract that can be accomplished
without an authentic act, as can uncompensated loans, mandates, pledges,
and deposits.239 Despite the similarity between charitable subscriptions
and donations, a more practical treatment of charitable subscriptions may
demand that they be treated like other gratuitous contracts that are not
subject to the burdensome authentic act form or perhaps as merely a
jurisprudential and customary exception to the rule of article 1541. Such a
distinction appears completely appropriate, given the societal desire to
facilitate these gratuitous pledges.
Finally, the Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that “where a
Louisiana Civil Code article has been derived from a French Civil Code
article, interpretation of the latter is highly instructive for, if not
determinative of, the interpretation of the former.”240 Although some
French cases have similarly adopted the characterization of pledges as
onerous contracts,241 Planiol, in his treatise on French civil law, adopts a
different rationale:
Subscriptions opened to create or sustain a work of charity of
public utility are donations which ought to fall within the principle
of solemnity, inasmuch as there is no text which excepts such
donations. But practically, the multiplicity and the small amount
of the individual subscriptions make the use of solemn forms
impossible . . . . It is thus preferable to consider this as a special
contract, sanctioned by reason of custom, a contract which is not
a donation but serves to realize a liberality.242
More recent authors on comparative donations law agree. Richard
Hyland in a work on the comparative law of gifts has stated the following
with regard to the French law of charitable subscriptions:
The case law appears to validate charitable subscriptions as
indirect gifts sui generis. Because only modest sums are generally
involved, notarial form is impractical. . . . In deciding that such
gifts are exempt from form requirements, the Cassation Court
239. See, e.g., id. art. 1890 (remission); id. art. 2904 (loan); id. art. 2993
(mandate); id. art. 3149 (pledge); id. art. 2929 (deposit).
240. Howard v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 986 So. 2d 47, 57 (La. 2008).
241. Smith, supra note 20, at 7–8 (“It has not been difficult for the French to
resolve the question by holding that the cause in such a case is not a will to give
or spirit of liberality but rather the intention of arriving at the end sought, the
creation or perpetuation of an agency in which the subscriber is interested.”).
242. 5 PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 116, § 418 (Author’s translation).
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employs the same language that is often used to validate indirect
gifts.243
Whatever the rationale, charitable pledges are enforceable in
Louisiana and elsewhere even without an authentic act. This Article
suggests that they are special gratuitous contracts, by virtue of custom and
practice, that should be treated as such and not as donations inter vivos.
Consequently, they are exempt from the traditional form requirements for
donations inter vivos and in compliance with the general rules of gratuitous
contracts.
C. Commutative, Independent, Aleatory, and Certain
Perhaps the most vexing conceptual puzzle in the modern Louisiana
contract classification scheme is the one distinguishing commutative from
aleatory contracts and differentiating commutative contracts from bilateral
ones. The biggest innovation in this area was the addition in 1825 and then
subsequent deletion in 1984 of “independent” contracts in contrast to
“commutative” ones and “certain” contracts in contrast to “aleatory”
ones.244 Common law sources, which have been suggested as a possible
source for these additions,245 do not appear fruitful, as Anglo-American
treatises on contract law were largely unknown in the eighteenth century
and Blackstone gives little time to the topic of contracts in his
commentaries.246 Powell, writing in 1790, published the first doctrinal
work on contract law. But no evidence of the newly added contracts can
be found in Powell (1790),247 or in Comyn (1823),248 Newland (1821),249
or Colebrooke (1818)250—the latter of whom demonstrates a heavy
reliance on Pothier and Roman law. Colebrooke, writing in 1818,
however, distinguishes commutative contracts from contingent ones and
notes that in commutative contracts the equivalent is exchanged, but when
the “equivalent consist[s] in the risk of loss, or the chance of gain,
243. RICHARD HYLAND, GIFTS 398 (2009).
244. Compare LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1762, 1768 (1825), with LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 1911, 1912 (2016).
245. LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 91, at 143.
246. GORDLEY, PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS, supra note 6, at 134.
247. JOHN JOSEPH POWELL, ESSAY UPON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS AND
AGREEMENTS (2d ed. 1790).
248. SAMUEL COMYN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO CONTRACTS
AND AGREEMENTS NOT UNDER SEAL (1823).
249. JOHN NEWLAND, A TREATISE ON CONTRACTS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION
OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY (1821).
250. H.T. COLEBROOKE, TREATISE ON OBLIGATIONS AND CONTRACTS (1818).
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dependent on an uncertain event, the contract is contingent and aleatory
or hazardous.”251 Pothier, on whom Colebrooke appears to rely, makes a
similar juxtaposition and provides a similar explanation.252 Still absent,
however, is the distinction between “aleatory” and “certain” contracts
adopted by the revision of 1825. Story, writing in 1856, observes a
distinction between an “absolute contract,” defined simply as “an
agreement to do or not to do something, at all events,” and a “conditional”
one, defined as “a contract, whose very existence and performance depend
on a contingency and condition.”253
1. The Division in the 1825 Code
Despite the historical uncertainty of the origin of independent and
certain contracts, the divisions or classes of contracts set out by the 1825
Civil Code and preserved in Louisiana law until 1984 did create a
seemingly sensible pairing for contracts, even though different from the
French. Commutative contracts were defined as “those in which what is
done, given or promised by one party, is considered as equivalent to, or a
consideration for what is done, given or promised by the other.”254 In
contrast, independent contracts were “those in which the mutual acts or
promises have no relation to each other, either as equivalents or as
considerations.”255 This distinction was one “in relation to [the contracts’]
substance.”256 What was essential was an interdependence between the
parties’ obligations. The Expose des Motifs suggests that this distinction
was introduced to make clear the application of the defense of nonperformance: “The redactors of the Civil Code of 1825 were greatly
concerned with the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. That concern, no
doubt, led them to introduce the distinction between ‘commutative’ and
‘independent’ contracts.”257 In other words, when one party to a dependent
obligation does not perform his obligation, the other party is not obliged
to perform his. On the other hand, if obligations are independent of each
other, nonperformance of one would give the other party a claim for
specific performance or damages but would not serve as basis for not
performing his own independent obligation. For example, in Poole v.
251. Id. at 17.
252. See POTHIER, supra note 87, at 9.
253. WILLIAM W. STORY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 30–31 (1856).
254. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1768 (1870).
255. Id. art. 1769.
256. Id. art. 1767.
257. Exposé des Motifs of the Projet of Titles III and IV of Book III of the Civil
Code of Louisiana, in 6 LA. CIV. CODE, at 6 (West 2008).
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Ward, the court found that a donation of a fractional interest in various
certificates of deposit in connection with the donees subsequent agreement
not to contest the succession proceedings through which the donor had
inherited the interest were not separate independent obligations but were
rather two dependent ones that formed part of the same compromise.258
Considered in terms of the “effects” of the contracts, the 1825 Civil
Code noted that contracts could be “certain” or “aleatory.”259 The object
of certain contracts would occur “in the usual course of events,” but
performance under an aleatory contract depended upon “an uncertain
event.”260 In truth, the category of “certain” contracts seems somewhat
artificial and expounded only to provide a residual category for all those
ordinary contracts where performance was not dependent upon an
uncertainty.
2. The Division in Modern Law
Present law, however, omits “independent” and “certain” and creates
an apparent pairing between commutative and aleatory contracts. The
current Louisiana Civil Code defines a commutative contract as one in
which “the performance of the obligation of each party is correlative to the
performance of the other.”261 No explanation, however, of what is meant
by “correlative” is provided.262 Comment (b) to article 1911 reminds the
reader of the importance of the term, whatever it might mean: “correlative
performances are the essential feature of commutative contracts.”263 Lest
one think this definition is reminiscent of the definition of “bilateral
contracts,” the reader is quickly reminded that “[a] distinction is thus made
between correlative obligations, which make a contract bilateral . . . and
correlative performances, which make the contract, not only bilateral but
also commutative.”264 Comment (c) then proceeds to explain that the
“correlative performances” of commutative contracts, rather than
correlative obligations of bilateral ones, “set[] forth the ground for the
traditional defense of nonperformance (exceptio non adimpleti contractus)
that operates in the sphere of commutative contracts alone.”265 After all,
258. Poole v. Ward, 576 So. 2d 1089, 1090 (La. Ct. App. 1991).
259. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1775 (1870).
260. Id. art. 1776.
261. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1911 (2016).
262. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 8.
263. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1911 cmt. b (emphasis added).
264. Id.
265. Id. cmt. c. In France, this defense seems more appropriately a characteristic
of bilateral contracts, as opposed to commutative ones. See, e.g., NICHOLAS, supra
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article 2022 provides that “[e]ither party to a commutative contract may
refuse to perform his obligation if the other has failed to perform or does
not offer to perform his own at the same time, if the performances are due
simultaneously.”266 Simultaneity of performances, then, is suggested by
this comment and article 2022 as the hallmark of commutative contracts
under the current law—a conclusion bolstered by comment (c) to the very
article, which provides that it applies “only where the performances of the
parties are to be rendered simultaneously.”267 By way of clarification, the
comment continues to provide an example of a bilateral contract that
cannot benefit from this article, even though the obligations are reciprocal,
because the performances are not due simultaneously: “[the article] does
not apply where the performances are not to be rendered simultaneously
as in the case of a lease.”268
But this is surely a mistake. The defense of non-performance is more
appropriately applied to bilateral contracts, not commutative ones.
Although the text of article 2022 seems to limit its application to
“commutative” contracts, it should not be further limited by the comments
suggesting that performance is due simultaneously. The simultaneity
explanation of commutative contracts has been ably critiqued by Alain
Levasseur, who has noted that, under this approach, the non-reciprocity of
performances could exist only when one performance is subject either to
a suspensive term or a suspensive condition.269 In either instance,
classification of the performances as “correlative” seems a poor way to
express the code articles on term and condition.270 Additionally, it is hard
to see what such a characterization adds to the Civil Code “except for
confusion and redundancy.”271
Indeed, the comments to the Civil Code requiring simultaneity of
performances appear to have confused commutative contracts with those
recognized in French contracts as being due instantaneously as opposed to
successively. French scholars recognize this distinction as being
traditional even if not part of formal French law. Terré, Simler, and
Lequette write of contracts à execution instantanée, which give rise to
obligations susceptible of being executed at one time, such as a sale or
note 119, at 39; 2 FRANÇOIS CHABAS, OBLIGATIONS 89, in LEÇONS DE DROIT CIVIL
(8th ed. 1991); 2 PLANIOL, supra note 199, at 549; 2 RIPERT & BOULANGER, supra
note 121 at 32; PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 116, at 36.
266. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2022.
267. Id. cmt. c.
268. Id.
269. See LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 9.
270. Id.
271. Id.
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exchange.272 Simultaneity of performance is not part of the law and should
not be read into the requirements of commutative contracts.
The revision documents appear to show that no change in meaning
was intended when the definition of commutative contracts was altered
from requiring “equivalents” to requiring “correlative performances.” In
fact, the concept of “equivalents” apparently was removed from
commutative contracts in a somewhat ill-fated attempt to clarify the law.
The reporter of the revision of the law of contracts explained the changes
as follows:
The word “equivalent” may suggest more than it really means. In
fact, if [Civil Code] article 1768 is read alone, it would seem that
an exchange of equivalent values is required. If read together with
[articles] 1860 and 1861, however, it becomes clear that, for the
sale of immovable at least, price and value of the thing are
regarded as equivalent when the former is no less than one half of
the latter. In such a context, all that is accomplished by the use of
the word “equivalent” is to connote an element of exchange. As
such element is also connoted by the word “commutative,” the
term “equivalent” may be eliminated from [article] 1768 without
altering its meaning. The word “equivalent” was written into
article 1104 of the Code Napoleon, from where it found its way
into [Louisiana Civil Code article] 1768, owing to the writings of
Pothier. A more realistic approach to commutative contracts is
very much in order today.273
But exact equivalents have never been required of commutative contracts,
as even Aquinas provided that relief should only be granted for “large
deviations” or laesio enormis.274 As further evidence that the modern
revision was not intended to usher in a new approach, comment (a) to
current article 1911 also makes clear that the 1984 revision “does not
change the law.”275 The idea of performances being considered as
272. FRANÇOIS TERRE, PHILIPPE SIMLER & YVES LEQUETTE, DROIT CIVIL:
LES OBLIGATIONS 83 (10th ed. 2009).
273. Saul Litvinoff, Revision of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870:
Memorandum No. 2, at 12 (La. State Law Inst., Jan. 20, 1973) (Materials Prepared
for the Meeting of Committee) (on file with Author) (citations omitted); see also
Saul Litvinoff, Revision of Book III of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870:
Obligation Revision (La. State Law Inst., Feb. 2–3, 1979) (Materials Prepared for
the Meeting of Committee) (on file with Author); Minutes of the Council (La.
State Law Inst., Feb. 2–3, 1979) (on file with Author).
274. See supra text accompanying note 79.
275. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1911 cmt. a (2016).
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“equivalent[s]” then should not be read strictly but still remains a part of
the concept of commutative contracts.
The juxtaposition of the article on “commutative” contracts with the
one immediately succeeding it on “aleatory” contracts, however, suggests
that more than mere “equivalence” is required. From a stylistic point, it
would be odd to have articles 1911 and 1912 operate independent of each
other and thus without any correspondence, given that the classification
articles in the Civil Code are provided in pairs: 1907 and 1908 on unilateral
and bilateral contracts; 1909 and 1910 on onerous and gratuitous contracts;
1913 on principal and accessory ones; and 1914 on nominate and
innominate ones.276 But the definition of an aleatory contract as
“uncertain” hardly seems the opposite of the definition of a commutative
one without building into commutative contracts the concept of
“certainty” of performance and equivalence. The Quebec Civil Code has
adopted this approach and states that “[a] contract is commutative when,
at the time it is formed, the extent of the obligations of the parties and of
the advantages obtained by them in return is certain and determinate.”277
The prior law did just that and paired “certain or aleatory” contracts
together.278 The French Code Civil likewise discusses commutative
(commutatif) and aleatory (aléatoire) contracts in the same article, creating
the same correspondence between the two in light of surrounding articles
discussing unilateral and bilateral and onerous and gratuitous contracts.279
In combining the concepts of “equivalence” and “certainty” for
commutative contracts, the characteristic quality of commutative contracts
in contrast to aleatory ones is that in the former the performances are
interdependent and their equivalence is immediately obvious and certain,
whereas in the latter no such interdependence or equivalence is required.
Further, the uncertainty of the performance of an aleatory contract or the
extent thereof often depends upon subsequent events, such as when an
insurance contract pays out an uncertain amount only upon the occurrence
of an uncertain event. Similarly, many French commentators write about
commutative and aleatory contracts as if they are two sides of the same
coin. Denis Tallon explains that commutative contracts, in contrast to
aleatory ones, require some knowledge of the certainty of what is owed by
noting that the difference is “the possibility of estimating at the time of
concluding the contract the scope of what is owed.”280 Other
commentators have explained that commutative contracts are “susceptible
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

Id. arts. 1907−1910, 1913, 1914.
Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 1382 (Can.).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1775 (1870).
C. CIV. art. 1104 (Fr.).
Tallon, supra note 99, at 208.
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to be immediately evaluated and not dependent, after the contract, on an
eventual uncertainty,” such as a sale of a house or a rent of an apartment.281
Similarly, Amos and Walton write that a contract is commutative “when
the extent of the [performances] which are owed by each of the parties is
immediately apparent.”282 Planiol and Ripert provide similarly.283 In fact,
Planiol explains the difference as follows:
[C]ommutative [contracts] are those in which each of the
contracting parities receives an equivalent for what he gives, as in
the contract of sale, the seller ought to give the thing sold, and
receive a price, which is the equivalent; the buyer ought to give
the price, and receive the thing sold, which is the equivalent. . . .
Aleatory (or hazardous) contracts are those by which one of the
contracting parties, without contributing any thing on his part,
receives something from the other, not by way of gift, but as a
compensation for the risk which he runs. All games of chance,
wagers, and contracts of insurance, are contracts of this
description.284
As evident from the above, the functions and definitions of both
“commutative” and “aleatory” contracts under current law are not
significantly different from their predecessors in the code of 1870. Both
current article 1912 and prior article 1776 are clear that a contract is
aleatory when performance “depends upon an uncertain event.”285
Comment (a) to article 1912 makes clear that the 1984 revision “does not
change the law.”286
In fact, correct thinking reveals that commutative and aleatory contracts
have an additional correspondence, as both are sub-classifications of
onerous contracts.287 French law is clear that neither commutative contracts
nor aleatory ones can be gratuitous because the intent in performing each
281. EUGENE GAUDEMET, THEORIE GENERALE DES OBLIGATIONS 24 (1937)
(Author’s translation); PHILIPPE MALAURIE, LAURENT AYNES & PHILIPPE
STOFFEL-MUNCK, DROIT CIVIL: LES OBLIGATIONS 201 (4th ed. 2009).
282. LAWSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 151.
283. PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 116, at 42 (“Un contrat est commutatif
lorsque l'éntendue des prestations que se doivent les parties est immédiatement
certaine.”); see also TERRÉ, SIMLER & LEQUETTE, supra note 272, at 81.
284. POTHIER, supra note 87, at 8.
285. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1912 (2016); LA. CIV. CODE art. 1776 (1870).
286. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1911 cmt. a, 1912 cmt. a (2016).
287. BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 110, at 28; GAUDEMET,
supra note 281, at 24; BÉNABENT, supra note 114, at 3; 1 POTHIER, supra note 87,
at 9; NICHOLAS, supra note 119, at 45; LAWSON ET AL., supra note 127, at 151.
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is to secure a counter performance.288 Because onerous contracts are those
in which each party performs in order to procure a counter performance,
one can readily see that if that performance is certain and regarded as
equivalent, then the performances are correlative and the contracts are
commutative.289 If performances are subordinated to a hope or chance,
they are aleatory.290 In addition to being onerous contracts, commutative
and aleatory contracts under the Louisiana Civil Code are also bilateral as
the defining civil code articles require that more than one party must
assume or undertake a performance or an obligation.291
The significance of this distinction is seen primarily in the case of the
defense of nonperformance as discussed above. In addition, lesion is
allowable in cases of commutative contracts but never in the case of
aleatory ones.292 Although the articles on lesion do not by their terms limit
their application to commutative contracts, it is clear that the basic
conceptions of commutative justice espoused by Aristotle and built into
contract law by the late scholastics and subsequent scholars limit this
remedy to instances of commutative justice when equivalents are
exchanged but not ultimately provided. Louisiana law has likewise limited
this remedy to commutative contracts. In McDonald v. Grande Corp., the
court refused to cancel a mineral lease and concluded that “[t]he
enforcement of [aleatory] contracts cannot be avoided on the grounds of
lesion, the chances of loss being of the essence in that kind of contract and
compensated by the chances of gain.”293
In short, the modern Louisiana Civil Code leaves much to be desired
in its presentation of commutative and aleatory contracts. Although
purporting to clarify the law, the latest revision seems to have created more
confusion than it avoided and created more uncertainty than is merited,
especially in light of the relative unimportance of this dichotomy. Even so,
288. MALAURIE, AYNÉS & STOFFEL-MUNCK, supra note 281, at 201.
289. Id.; BEUDANT & LEREBOURS-PIGEONNIÈRE, supra note 110, at 28.
290. MALAURIE, AYNÉS & STOFFEL-MUNCK, supra note 281, at 202.
291. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1911 (defining commutative contracts as those in
which both parties have performances); Id. at art. 1912 (defining an aleatory
contract as one in which “either party’s obligation” is subject to some
uncertainty); see also MALAURIE, AYNÉS & STOEFFEL-MUNCK, supra note 281,
at 201 (defining the distinction between aleatory and commutative contracts as a
sub-distinction of bilateral contracts under onerous title).
292. GAUDEMET, supra note 281, at 24−25; BUFFELAN-LANORE & LARRIBAUTERNEYRE, supra note 129, at 246; MALAURIE, AYNÉS & STOFFEL-MUNCK, supra
note 281, at 203. For a good discussion of the history and development of lesion
law in Louisiana, see Dian Tooley-Knoblett & David Gruning, SALES, in 26
LOUISIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 623–49 (2012).
293. McDonald v. Grande Corp., 214 So. 2d 795, 806 (La. Ct. App. 1968).
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this comparative and historical analysis suggests that the distinction might
still be tenable.
D. Principal and Accessory
The fourth distinction of contracts in Louisiana law is that between
principal and accessory.294 Principal contracts are those in which secured
obligations arise by virtue of a contract, whereas accessory ones are made
to “provide security for the performance of an obligation.”295 The meaning
of this dichotomy is clear. “A principal contract is one which can stand on
its own; it needs no legal (contractual or otherwise) support than its own
to exist . . . .”296 An accessory contract, on the other hand, needs a principal
contract to exist. It supports and bolsters a principal contract but cannot
exist on its own. A sale, lease, and loan are principal contracts, whereas a
suretyship, mortgage, or pledge is an accessory one.297
The distinction between the principal and accessory contracts is
obvious but important. An accessory contract cannot exist without a
principal one, but the reverse is not true.298 A mortgage is not valid once
the loan has been extinguished. A pledge is not enforceable if the
underlying obligation is not valid. The invalidity of a suretyship or other
accessory obligation, however, does not affect the validity of the
underlying principal obligation.
E. Nominate and Innominate
The fifth and final distinction in Louisiana contract law is between
nominate and innominate contracts.299 Nominate contracts are those with
special designation or names, such as “sale, lease, loan, or insurance.”300
Innominate contracts are those “with no special designation.”301 The
distinction is important because nominate contracts, such as sale or lease,
are governed by special rules, whereas innominate ones are subject to the
general rules on contracts. Unlike Roman law, the classification of the
contract does not affect its enforceability. As stated long ago by the
Louisiana Supreme Court, “[i]f there be a valid existing cause for a
294.
295.
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

LITVINOFF, supra note 20, § 110, at 194.
LA. CIV. CODE art. 1913 (2016).
LEVASSEUR, supra note 5, at 11.
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Id.
Id.
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contract, it is immaterial that it should not fall under some contract
particularly named or classified in the Code.”302 In Thielman v. Gahlman,
a grantor conveyed property to a grantee in exchange for support and a
home during the life of the grantor and burial after death.303 Given the
uncertainty involved in the grantee’s performance, the court appropriately
noted that this contract was aleatory and thus could not be attacked on the
grounds of lesion.304 Moreover, given the performances to be exchanged
in this bilateral contract and the uncertainty as to the price, this contract
was innominate and thus subject to the general rules on contracts.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the classification of contracts clearly has a long history
in the civil law. Although the purpose of classifying contracts has changed
over the years, almost as much as the categories themselves, modern law
still attaches many important consequences to the classification scheme.
Through the use of historical analysis and comparative research, this
Article has articulated and clarified those consequences.
It is beyond cavil that the scheme adopted by the drafters of the
Louisiana Civil Code is far from perfect, and this Article has not been
reluctant to criticize the modern approach. The current classification
system, however, is still relevant for ascertaining remedies and, in many
instances, the applicable law. As has been noted elsewhere, “in matters of
law, as it is also the case in other sciences, classifications should always
be taken with some reservations.”305 Classification systems are useful as
rules of thumb, but must not be pursued blindly and without attention to
the outcomes they produce.306 Cautious skepticism should always prevail,
as Louisiana’s contract classification systems are “but tentative conceptual
schemes that are valid only to the extent they are useful. When they cease
to be useful, they should be abandoned.”307 The Romans realized this when
they allowed for the enforceability of a variety of innominate contracts
outside their traditional four-fold system. Louisiana scholars, judges, and
lawyers should, too.
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